In this article we examine the back…ll bias or instant history bias for hedge funds using additional information from the Tass database. This is information about the exact date a hedge fund starts to reporting to Tass. Using this information we are able to reveal the length of the instant histories. We …nd these to be just over 3 years on average. This number is far greater than previously documented. More than half of the recorded returns in the database are back…lled. The magnitude of the overall back…ll bias is about 4 percent per annum on average. Again this number exceeds all previous estimates of the back…ll bias we are aware of.
Introduction
The back…ll or instant-history bias appears when hedge funds with good track records decide to report, and data providers back…ll their …les to show this track record. Recently, several studies appeared which try to estimate the size of the back…ll bias. There is evidence that the size of the back…ll bias is substantial. Consequently, performance numbers of hedge funds are in general upward biased. Therefore a good notion of the size of this bias is important for asset allocation decisions to hedge funds.
In this paper instead of estimating the back…ll bias we exactly determine the back…ll bias. We do this for the Tass hedge funds database 1 . The edge in our research is that to calculate this bias we used the exact date the funds decide to report to Tass. With this information we can determine for each fund the time periods that are back…lled.
Subsequently, we can remove the back…lled returns from our data set in order to obtain a data set that is free of back…ll bias.
We will use our back…ll bias free data set to investigate the following. A hedge fund manager is not required to report and is free to set up as many hedge funds as he likes.
Our hypothesis is that a hedge fund manager will not report the performance over the …rst periods to a database vendor instantaneously. Instead, a hedge fund manager will report afterwards, and only if funds performed well. There is an analogy to the story about the investment newsletter. An investment …rm sends investment newsletters to 1024 people. The …rst half receives a buy recommendation, and the second half a sell recommendation. Suppose the buy recommendation proves to be right. A week later 1 For information see: www.tassresearch.com the 512 people that received the buy recommendation, now receive a new letter: half of them a new buy and half of them a sell recommendation. 256 people will get a correct recommendation again. When we select and divide the groups who got the correct recommendations further till we get 64 people, the remaining 64 people have received correct recommendations four times in a row without one failure in four weeks. An investment …rm with such track record has a good position to acquire new customers.
The only drawback are the people who have got the wrong recommendation, they are less likely to become customers. Imagine now, that the investment …rm is sending the four correct recommendations with falsi…ed time stamps, directly to 1024 people who are returning from their 5 weeks holidays. Instead of 64 out of 1024, the investment …rm has made a good impression to 1024 out of 1024 potential customers. Database vendors have back…lled hedge funds in their databases. Tass provided us the fund-speci…c entry dates, so in the analogy we know when the investment newsletters were mailed. The fact that hedge funds are not allowed to advertise publicly, but use database listings as an important marketing vehicle, deepens the above analogy.
Using basic statistical techniques and the fund-speci…c entry dates we reveal the back…ll bias in the Tass database. Our data set ranges from 1996 to 2002. The average length of the back…ll period in this sample is about 34 months, which is higher than reported earlier. An investment strategy, which is based on investing in a fund only if the fund is not in its back…ll period, is a more realistic investment strategy than investing in back…lled periods. We introduce an investor who invests at every point in time an equal amount of money in each fund that is at that particular time listed in the Tass database. Doing so, we basically construct a non-back…lled equally weighted hedge fund index return series. Conditional on this investment strategy our results indicate the following. On average the non-back…lled index series has a 4% lower return per annum than the back…lled series., When we compare our results with results of , who estimate the back…ll bias in the Tass database to be 1.4% annually, we conclude the back…ll bias to be severely underestimated. Our results are consistent for most styles and over di¤erent periods. To examine whether the results are stable trough time we break the available data period in subsets of one year.
For an investor who tracks the funds in the Tass database we show that returns are signi…cantly lower. Agarwal & Naik (2000) reported persistence in quarterly returns of hedge funds. Brown, Goetzmann & Ibbotson (1999) and Kat & Menexe (2003) found little or no evidence of persistence in mean returns of hedge funds. We …nd no persistence between the returns of the back…lled and the non-back…lled period.
Funds have an incentive to hide bad performance both before going to report and after leaving the database due to termination. Database vendors are not able to obtain all returns from terminating funds. Therefore we construct three scenario tests to show how additional negative performance could in ‡uence returns. Our analysis may have a large impact on asset allocation decisions to hedge funds, because our returns are substantially lower than those reported earlier.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 1 describes biases in hedge funds data.
In section 2 we discuss and analyze the length of the instant histories in di¤erent time periods. Section 3 examines the in ‡uence of three liquidation scenarios on returns. Section 4 concludes.
Biases in hedge fund data
Because hedge funds are not obliged to report, information is scattered over di¤erent databases. The total base capital under management in the hedge fund industry is estimated to be over US$ 600 billion according to Hedgeworld and Tremont 2 .
The data used to determine hedge fund returns is far from perfect. Whereas, mutual funds are required to report their daily net asset value (NAV) by law, this is not the case for hedge funds. Therefore data problems are much more likely to occur.
Knowledge about the way the data is gathered gives insight in the potential biases in the data and the limitations of usage of the data. Besides that, new and terminating hedge funds e¤ect the structure of the database. The use of derivatives and leverage by hedge funds increases the risk of termination compared to mutual funds. The fact that reporting is voluntarily and the data collection processes by data vendors gives rise to the variety of biases in hedge fund data. Therefore distinguish between natural and spurious biases. Natural biases arise from the birth, growth and death processes of hedge funds, while spurious biases arise from sampling from an unobservable universe of hedge funds and the way data vendors collect hedge fund information as discussed above. Natural biases are for example survivorship and self-selection biases. Other biases originate from the drive of hedge fund managers to present good performance combined with the opportunity to in ‡uence the return …gures. Furthermore the way research is carried out on these databases may cause biases. One can think for example of regression analysis, which requires funds with a minimum number of periods to analyze, which will result in neglect of funds with small return histories. The di¤erent subsets of funds and return histories that are taken into account, may in ‡uence returns upward or downward. Survivorship biases stems from analyzing surviving funds only. Survivorship biases are de…ned di¤erently by various authors:
(i) survivorship bias is comparing a sample containing defunct funds with a sample that does not contain defunct funds.
(ii) survivorship bias is comparing a sample containing all funds with a sample that does not contain defunct funds.
(iii) survivorship bias originates from defunct funds, failing to report their last returns. This bias is also called liquidation bias. Outperforming funds could protect their winning strategies, and stop the in ‡ow of new capital by stopping to report and closing the fund. Hedge funds may decide to get a good track record before they start to report. This also results in a self-selection bias that is more di¢cult to estimate. There are three possible development paths for these funds. First, they can become so successful that they have no incentive to report because they acquired enough capital. Second, they become successful and reporting to databases will have bene…ts for them, e.g. reaching more investors and increasing capital. The last possibility is an unsuccessful fund that terminates without ever reporting.
The back…ll or instant history bias appears when hedge funds with (good) track records decide to report and data providers back…ll their …les to show this track record. with other researchers we use a direct method of examining the back…ll bias. Instead of eliminating the same average or median incubation period for all funds, the direct method eliminates the individual incubation period per fund. The information that we use in this paper is information from Tass. Tass provided us the dates for which the funds started reporting to the database. We eliminate the returns for each fund before the reporting date.
Scenarios
Note that a fund that terminated without ever reporting to a database is not taken into analysis. The fact that we have no data about not reported returns, leads us do our analysis on conditionally on the available universe. Investing in the complete hedge funds universe is impossible. Laws prohibiting marketing of hedge funds and the freedom to refrain from reporting by hedge funds, leave us unknown about the complete set of hedge funds. An investor cannot invest in a hedge fund, which existence is not known to him. Therefore we introduce an investor who invests an equal amount in all hedge funds that report in a database at every point in time. Using the non-back…lled returns we can assess the returns as they actually were available to the investor. The investor is basically an index investor, where the index is equally weighted and index membership is determined by reporting to the database. This is a real time and implementable investment strategy that only invests in all hedge funds that are in a speci…c point in time in the Tass database. To determine 'known' hedge funds we use the Tass database. A hedge fund is added to the Tass database when the hedge fund manager decides to report. We assume that at this speci…c point in time our investor is able to invest in the added hedge fund 5 . The database contains prior returns of the fund, which are not investable during this period, while he was unaware of the existence of the fund. Our investor holds an equally weighted portfolio of all hedge funds that are in the database at a given moment, except for the hedge funds that are in their back…ll period. The portfolios are rebalanced every month. We include all stoppedreporting or 'graveyard' funds, which have been recorded by Tass since January 1994.
This makes our data sample a so-called survivorship free sample, and does not demand from our investor the foresight to know which funds are going to leave the database (look ahead bias). The survivorship bias, which consists of termination, liquidation and self-selection biases, is therefore partly neutralized. Partly because returns from funds that leave the database are incorporated till they leave. However, lockup periods and fund liquidations can prevent an investor to withdraw his investments after the fund has left the database. Liquidation and time biases still exist. In order to give insight in the possible magnitude of liquidation and time biases we set up several scenarios. The …rst scenario is based on …ndings of Ackermann et al. (1999) , who found a negligible impact of liquidation and time biases 6 . In this scenario we assume the extra return to be zero. The second and third scenarios are based on information from Tass employees 7 , who are -not withstanding their systematic e¤orts -unable 6 Ackermann et al. (1999) used information from HFR. HFR polled terminating funds and were able to recover all returns through the instant of redemption for all of their terminating funds. Overall, the average loss in fund value beyond the information contained in the database is only 0.7% and average delay is 18 days.
to obtain the last not reported return histories from all terminating funds. Funds leaving the database exhibit indirect reporting. Rather than reporting directly we observe many non-terminated hedge funds delay their reporting several months. In this manner poor performing funds could choose to cancel reporting totally if poor performance persists. We assume that terminating funds are not willing to cooperate due to serious negative performance after leaving the database. From many terminated large hedge funds it is known that they could not return the total principal investments.
Long Term Capital Management is a famous example, this fund lost 92% of capital from October 1997 to October 1998 and did not report to databases. The fear of a collapse of the …nancial system urged the Federal Reserve Bank to take action, and through this action, returns are known for this not reporting fund. Therefore we respectively add an extra negative return in the month they stop reporting of 50% and 100% in the second and third scenario. The survivorship bias assessed by comparing a sample including defunct funds with a sample excluding defunct funds changes when considering only non-back…lled returns. Dropout or attrition rates increase due to smaller periods of returns histories. All our results are conditional on the investment strategy outlined above.
Data
The hedge fund industry is growing at a fast pace, growth in assets under management is estimated to be 40% per annum. We chose the Tass database for our analysis. Compared to traditional asset managers, hedge funds charge aggressive fees this is typically 1 or 2% of assets under management, and 20% of cumulative pro…ts on a yearly basis. The returns we use are net of fees except for a few hedge funds for which Tass did not receive the returns net of fees.
Both onshore and o¤shore hedge funds are used in our analysis. A o¤shore hedge fund di¤ers from a onshore hedge fund, in that it is registered in a tax-haven. The dominant motivation for the existence of o¤shore hedge funds is to minimize tax liabilities to non-U.S. citizens. Most hedge funds report in U.S. dollars. We converted returns reported in other currencies to U.S. dollars. We select the monthly reporting funds for which we have information on the …rst reporting dates, and eliminate the quarterly reporting funds. This brings our sample down to 3580 funds. First records for the reporting dates are kept from January 1994. Information prior to January 1994 in the Tass database is too sporadic to provide meaningful results. Due to the small number of funds, which have returns after their reporting date in 1994 and 1995, constructed indices without back…lled returns have a very small basis compared to the back…lled indices. In 1996, however it is possible to construct indices without back…lling for the majority of hedge fund styles with a reasonable basis, so we perform our analysis on the period January 1996 to December 2002. In order to assess di¤erences of the back…ll bias through time we break the total period up in subsets of years ranging from 1996 to 2002. To test the consistency of our …ndings by style, we break the funds sample returns further up in 10 hedge fund styles. To determine which style a hedge fund has, we use the category label assigned by Tass. Non-reporting funds can have several reasons to stop reporting. We assume funds that drop from the database due to merging in another entity, no longer reporting to tass, or closed to new investments not to have additional negative performance. Liquidation, fund dormant, and not being able to contact the manager, are reasons for us to assume additional (negative) performance. So funds that stop reporting due to the latter reasons are incorporated in the liquidation scenario analysis. The salient features of the raw data are in Table   1   8 . We observe that Convertible Arbitrage, Event Driven, Fixed Income Arbitrage and Emerging Markets behave quite similarly. These styles show both substantial negative skewness and excess kurtosis of the return distribution. Together with Equity Market Neutral they also share the property of high positive autocorrelation of the returns. These features are reported earlier in the hedge fund literature. We can also deduce relatively high Sharpe ratios for these styles. This has also been noted earlier.
Given the methodology used by the di¤erent data vendors we have no reasons to believe that our conclusions are limited to the Tass database.
Empirical …ndings
Given the short returns history (1994-2002) we employ it is impossible to assess back…ll biases caused by incubation periods larger than 9 years. This seems to be no In scenario 2 and 3 we add respectively an additional negative return of 50 and Tables containing back…ll and liquidation biases, t-statistics, back…lled returns, and back…ll eliminated returns for scenarios 2 and 3 are placed at the end of this paper. Scenarios 2 and 3 in which terminating funds get an additional negative return deliver higher and more signi…cant biases. The negative return is added to the last reporting date of terminating funds. The last returns of terminating funds are mostly not in back…ll periods, because it makes no sense reporting returns at a point in time, where the fund is not investable anymore. There are some exceptions, a few funds started reporting during the same month they terminated. The back…ll period is assumed to include the month, in which the fund is going to report, while the investor is not able to invest for that whole month in the fund. The return over all periods and styles for back…lled samples drops from 10.73% in the …rst scenario (no additional returns) to respectively 7.43% and 3.95% percent for scenario 2 and 3. Biases increase from 4.35% (…rst scenario) to 7.24% and 10.13% percent for scenario 2 and 3. This leads overall back…ll eliminated performance drop from 6.38% (…rst scenario) to 0.11% and -6.18% percent for the two scenarios. It also has substantial e¤ects on skewness and kurtosis. As we are adding large negative outlier in the left tail of the distribution, the skewness will become more negative and the kurtosis increases.
All in all, our most conservative estimate of the back…ll bias is 4.35% per month.
This number is statistically signi…cant. In money terms this is also a signi…cant amount. From the years 1996 and 1997 less than 40 percent of the returns is a non-back…lled return. Together with relatively few funds, this could give rise to more fund speci…c volatility in the constructed indices.
Biases are highly signi…cant for all styles except Dedicated Short. Scarcity of data could cause these results. The style category Dedicated Short consist of less than 11
hedge funds in the non-back…lled index during every period.
Fund of funds are often considered the most bias free styles of hedge funds. However, fund of funds still exhibit a signi…cant back…ll bias of 2.27 percent per annum, which is a substantial amount of their average back…lled annual return (7.83).
Incorporating return scenarios after leaving the database for terminating funds, the back…ll bias increases signi…cantly. In the scenario of minus 50% additional return …ve styles are able to show positive performance. Convertible arbitrage, long short equity hedge, event driven, and equity market neutral deliver returns of respectively 3.5, 2.9, 5.5, and 3.6 percent. The performance of funds of funds is not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. In the scenario of minus 100% additional return only the event driven style is able to deliver a low positive return, which still remains below the risk free rate. Tables   1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Table 16 : Non-back…lled returns per style per year from scenario 3: terminated funds have a 100% negative return after leaving the database.
